Introduction
In recent decades, there has been an increased emphasis on the systematic evaluation of mental health services through routine outcome measurement (ROM; Slade, 2002a,b; Burgess et al., 2009; Van Hees et al., 2011) . Clinicians must now systematically collect data on relevant outcome variables before an intervention and during or after an intervention in order to assess the evidence in these data for or against an intervention effect. Using routine outcome measurement interventions can be evaluated and possibly improved, resulting in benefits such as cost effectiveness and quality enhancement (Slade, 2002a,b) .
The use of ROM data for the evaluation of interventions has not gone without criticism (e.g., Van Os et al., 2012) . Nevertheless, the importance of the systematic evaluation of interventions with the aid of ROM is increasing. Thus, although clinicians may act primarily upon clinical considerations, scores on criterion variables are increasingly used; consequently statistical arguments are needed to decide whether or not data provide evidence for psychotherapeutic treatment effects. In this paper we concentrate on how to best provide statistical evidence for treatment effects.
As is well-known from classical test theory, if the collected scores from the baseline and intervention phase would be completely reliable, it would be sufficient to collect one baseline observation and one intervention observation and compare the two scores with each other, in order to see whether a subject has changed after the intervention. However, in psychology, observed scores are typically contaminated with measurement error (Buonaccorsi, 2010) . That is, part of an observed score reflects the true score of an individual, and part of the observed score reflects random measurement error. The larger the amount of measurement 140 CHAPTER 5. IMPROVING THE ANALYSIS OF ROUTINE OUTCOME MEASUREMENT DATA: WHAT A BAYESIAN APPROACH CAN DO FOR YOU error, the less information an observed score contains about the outcome variable that it is supposed to measure.
The contamination of true scores with measurement error makes the interpretation of the difference between two scores difficult, because the differences observed over time could be partly or solely due to random measurement error, instead of a true difference. Several statistical tests have been developed which are supposed to disentangle true differences from random measurement error. For example, the reliable change index (RCI; Jacobson and Truax, 1991) divides the observed difference between two scores by the standard error of the difference. If the RCI exceeds a certain threshold, the difference is considered reliable, that is, not due to random measurement error.
Two broad types of statistical tests have been developed for ROM data. The first type, derived from the classical statistical approach, is aimed at making decisions while controlling the rates of certain kinds of errors. More specifically, these kind of tests are designed to keep the proportion of false rejections of the null hypothesis (that is, concluding a subject reliably changed while the subject actually did not change) below a certain level, typically .05. This type of test, of which the RCI is an example, are often called null hypothesis significance tests. The second type of tests, Bayesian hypothesis testing, is aimed at quantifying evidence in observed data for two competing hypotheses. For example, we might want to compare the evidence for the hypothesis that a subject did not truly change versus the hypothesis that a subject did truly change. Depending on the goal of the analyst, one type of test can be more useful than the other type.
While classical tests like the RCI are well-known within the field of ROM, Bayesian hypothesis tests are not. In practice, tests like the RCI are used not only for making decisions with controlled error rates but also for the purpose of quantifying evidence. Unfortunately, this leads to decisions based on flimsy evidence and invalid reasoning (Goodman, 1999b; Rouder et al., tted) . The issue of using classical tests for the quantification of evidence is also part of a broader issue regarding the nonreproducibility of many of scientific findings. Johnson (2013) mentioned several causes of nonreproducibility of scientific findings, including the commonly used statistical testing procedures.
Below we will discuss the two types of statistical tests in more detail and explain when each is suitable. We will also make clear why classical tests like the RCI are not based on an assessment of the strength of the evidence. Subsequently, we will demonstrate the use of Bayesian hypothesis testing with an empirical ROM data set and compare the results with outcomes from the RCI. For the sake of demonstration, we will restrict ourselves to hypothesis tests regarding change at the individual level, briefly discussing group change in the discussion.
Testing intervention effects
When researchers would like to determine the effect of an intervention, two types of hypothesis tests might be of interest. First, the researcher might want to make
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sure that in the long run, the hypothesis of no true change is only falsely rejected in a small proportion: typically 5%, of the total number of tests performed. That is, when tests would be performed for an infinitely large number of subjects, in only 5% of the tests it would be concluded that a subject changed while in fact the subject did not change. When this controlling of false rejections is the aim of the researcher, the interest is not in whether there is evidence for change in specific subjects or, in general, in whether a particular hypothesis is true. Rather, the aim is to keep the overall proportion of false rejections at a certain threshold. The RCI is one test that suits this aim. When an RCI of 1.96 or more extreme is found for a subject, it is concluded that the subject reliably changed. If there were truly no difference, then in the long run the conclusion of reliable change is wrongly made for only 5% of the tests performed.
A second aim of the researcher could be to quantify how much evidence the data contain for or against specific hypotheses regarding change, like the hypothesis that a particular subject did or did not truly change. In practice, tests like the RCI are often used for this aim as well, by using the p value of the test. For the RCI, the p value is the probability of obtaining the observed RCI or a more extreme value, given that there is no true difference. An RCI of 1.96 corresponds to a p value of .05; RCIs more extreme than 1.96 correspond to smaller p values. When a small p value is found, this thus means that the probability of finding an RCI at least as extreme as the one actually observed, given that there is no true change, is small. The conclusion that is often linked to this outcome is that therefore the hypothesis of no true change must probably be false (Haller and Krauss, 2002) . That is, the small p value is interpreted as evidence against the hypothesis of no true change, and statements are made like "there is a significant effect of therapy X (p = .01)" suggesting that the small p value implies that the effect is probably truly there (see e.g., Lambert et al., 2003; Simpson et al., 2003; Stiles et al., 2006) . Unfortunately, p values cannot be interpreted in this way, and hence tests like the RCI are not the most appropriate tests to quantify evidence in observed data for or against true change. We will illustrate this with an analogy.
Logical problems of using p values as evidence
The logic of using small p values as evidence against the null hypothesis hinges on their rarity, if the null hypotheses were true. The logic rests on generalization of standard falsificationism, and can be expressed in the following way:
• If hypothesis A were true (there is truly no difference), then X (p < .05) probably would not occur.
• X occurred (p < .05).
• Therefore, A is unlikely (there probably is a true difference).
Unfortunately, the reasoning just outlined is based on flawed logic (Pollard and Richardson, 1987; Rouder et al., tted) . In order to see how this logic is flawed,
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CHAPTER 5. IMPROVING THE ANALYSIS OF ROUTINE OUTCOME MEASUREMENT DATA: WHAT A BAYESIAN APPROACH CAN DO FOR YOU suppose we observe a person who is a specialist in the treatment of eating disorders and we are interested in whether this person is a psychotherapist or not. We further know that among psychotherapists, only 1% is specialized in the treatment of eating disorders. Thus, given that a person is a psychotherapist, the probability that this person is a specialist in the treatment of eating disorders is only 1%. According to the reasoning underlying the use of p values as a measure of evidence, the knowledge that the person we observed is a specialist in the treatment of eating disorders should lead us to conclude that we have evidence that this person is not a psychotherapist, since the probability of being a specialist in the treatment of eating disorders, given that one is a psychotherapist, is very small. The fact that we have observed an unlikely event under the hypothesis that the person is a psychotherapist, is interpreted as evidence against this hypothesis:
• If a person is a psychotherapist, they probably do not specialize in treating eating disorders.
• They specialize in treating eating disorders.
• Therefore, it is unlikely that they are a psychotherapist.
Obviously, the fact that the probability that a person is a specialist in the treatment of eating disorders, given that the person is a psychotherapist, is only 1%, is by itself meaningless with respect to the evidence for the hypothesis that the person is a psychotherapist. Afterall, the probability that a person is a specialist in the treatment of eating disorders, given that the person is not a psychotherapist, may be even smaller. Hence, the fact that the probability that a person is a specialist in the treatment of eating disorders, given that the person is a psychotherapist, is only 1%, would become more meaningful if we would compare this probability to the probability that a person is a specialist in the treatment of eating disorders given that the person is not a psychotherapist. Specifically, the ratio of these two probabilities would be the relative evidence for the two competing hypotheses in the data, with evidence expressed as the change in relative belief about the two hypotheses justified by the data (Good, 1985) . In the statistical field called Bayesian statistics, the statistic that quantifies this relative evidence in observed data for two competing hypotheses is called the Bayes factor (e.g., Goodman, 1999a). The Bayes factor thus quantifies evidence in data for or against particular hypotheses, rather than controlling error rates, like classical tests like the RCI do. Below we will illustrate the concept of relative evidence in more detail and discuss several properties of the Bayes factor.
Relative Evidence and Bayes Factor
In the previous section we illustrated why we should look at the relative evidence in observed data for competing hypotheses, rather than p values, if we are interested in evidence for hypotheses. The relative evidence can be quantified as the relative likelihood of the observed data under two competing hypotheses. Below we will illustrate the concept of relative evidence with two examples more related to ROM data. Consider a simple situation in which a participant has provided two preintervention observation and one post-intervention observation. Assume for the sake of demonstration that the measurement errors for these three observations are independent. We might consider two hypotheses about the pre-and postintervention observations: first, that they have the same mean; and second, that they have different means. In particular, we might want to compare the null hypothesis δ = 0 with the alternative hypothesis that δ = 4, where δ is the standardized effect size. We summarize the observed difference between the mean pre-and post-intervention scores with a t statistic. Each of the two hypotheses makes a prediction about the distribution of observed t statistics, as shown in Figure 5 .1A. The solid line shows how likely various observed t statistics are if the null hypothesis were true. The dotted line shows the same if the alternative hypothesis were true.
Suppose now that we observe a data set for which the standardized mean difference d = 13.0, corresponding to a t value of t = 10.6, represented by the dashed vertical line in Figure 5 .1A. The likelihood of these data under the null hypothesis equals .0028, whereas the likelihood of these data under the alternative hypothesis equals .022. The data are thus .022/.0028 = 7.9 times more likely under the alternative hypothesis than under the null hypothesis. In other words,
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CHAPTER 5. IMPROVING THE ANALYSIS OF ROUTINE OUTCOME MEASUREMENT DATA: WHAT A BAYESIAN APPROACH CAN DO FOR YOU the data support the alternative hypothesis that δ = 4, as compared to the hypothesis that δ = 0, by a factor of almost 8. The evidence in the data is clearly favoring the alternative hypothesis. The p value in this example equals p = .06. This p value is larger than .05, which would generally lead researchers to conclude that there is not enough evidence in the data to reject the null hypothesis. If interpreted incorrectly, the p value would lead us to retain the null, although under our alternative the data are more likely than under the null.
Suppose now that we observe a data set based on five pre-intervention observations and four post-intervention observations, again assuming that all measurement errors are independent. We observe a standardized mean difference d = 1.6, corresponding to a t value of t = 2.4. The likelihood of these data under the null hypothesis equals .035 whereas the likelihood of these data under the alternative hypothesis equals .0047. The data are thus .035/.0047 = 7.4 times more likely under the null hypothesis than under the alternative hypothesis. That is, the data support the null hypothesis by a factor of 7.4, as shown in Figure 5 .1B. The p value for these data equals p = .048. Since this p value is smaller than .05, it would generally be concluded that the null hypothesis can be rejected and that the data contain evidence for the alternative hypothesis. This again contradicts the conclusion based on the likelihood ratio. Taken together, the two examples show that the weight of evidence and the p value can imply opposite inferences. The p value is not a measure of evidence, and should not be treated as such.
As illustrated above, the Bayes factor is a ratio of two likelihoods: the likelihood of the data under one hypothesis (e.g., a person is a psychotherapist or a subject has not truly changed) divided by the likelihood of the data under the competing hypothesis (e.g., a person is not psychotherapist or a subject has truly changed). When the observed data are equally likely to have occurred under each of the hypotheses, the Bayes factor is equal to 1, meaning that the evidence in the data for one hypothesis is just as large as the evidence in the data for the competing hypothesis. When the data are more likely to have occurred under one hypothesis than under the competing hypothesis, as was the case in our example above, the Bayes factor deviates from 1, meaning that the evidence in the data for one hypothesis is stronger than the evidence in the data for the competing hypothesis. The more the Bayes factor deviates from 1, the stronger the evidence for one hypothesis over the other. Several factors can affect the strength of the evidence, including the number of data points, the reliability of the data, and the effect size.
Thus far, we have only used highly simplified examples, where the alternative hypothesis consisted of only one value: δ = 4. In practice, of course, we do not have such specific expectations about what the effect size is under the alternative hypothesis. Typically we have less specific expectations; for instance, that large effect sizes are implausible compared to smaller ones. The Bayes factor not only works with simple hypotheses like those in the demonstration above, but also with composite hypotheses, where our expectations for the effect size are a distributed over a range.
The reason why the Bayes factor can be interpreted as evidence is that it
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also turns out (by Bayes' theorem) to be the amount by which a rational person should adjust their relative beliefs about the hypotheses in light of the observed data. For example, we could believe, prior to observing the data, that the odds for the intervention to be effective relative to being ineffective is 3. That is, we already have some faith in the effectiveness based on earlier positive results. Based on newly collected data we might then find a Bayes factor indicating that the data are ten times more likely under the hypothesis of true change relative to the hypothesis of no true change. Following from Bayes' theorem, this means that we should update our prior beliefs of 3 by a factor of 10, resulting in new odds of 3 × 10 = 30: These so-called "posterior odds" reflect our relative belief in the hypotheses after observing the data. The role of evidence is thus to change beliefs in a rational manner. Note that prior odds also affect the amount of evidence that could be considered "large" or "enough". A Bayes factor of 50 could be interpreted as large for someone with a prior odds of 1, but would be much smaller for someone with a prior odds of 1, 000, 000. The Bayes factor should always be interpreted in a context. To summarize, the posterior odds of two competing hypotheses equals the prior odds of the two hypotheses multiplied by the Bayes factor, with the Bayes factor quantifying the relative evidence in the data for the two competing hypotheses. Note that the prior odds of the two hypotheses is subjective. For instance, a behavior therapist may be more skeptical of an intervention based on psychoanalysis than a psychoanalyst, and hence hold a prior odds that is less in favor of the effectivenes of the intervention then the prior odds of the psychoanalyst. Note, though, that the Bayes factor does not depend on the prior odds. The Bayes factor only indicates by what factor the prior odds should be changed in light of the data. Thus, researchers can end up with different posterior odds based on the same Bayes factor, due to different prior odds. This is natural; different scientists of course have different background information, and thus may not come to an experiment with the same information.
Clinical and Statistical Change in One Measure
A useful flexibility of the Bayes factor is that hypotheses regarding the absence of change are not restricted to zero change. We could just as well test whether a subject changed by a clinically relevant amount or not. For instance, we could define a standardized mean difference larger than .2 as clinically relevant, and compute the evidence in a data set for the hypothesis of a standardized mean difference larger than .2 as compared to the hypothesis of a standardized mean difference smaller than .2 (Morey and Rouder, 2011).
De Vries and Morey (2013) 
Empirical Example
In this section we will compute Bayes factors proposed by de Vries et al. (tion), which quantify the relative evidence in the data for zero mean change as compared to non-zero mean change, and RCIs for an empirical ROM data set, and show how conclusions based on each of the hypothesis tests can differ. We used data from the Brief Symptom Inventory (Derogatis, 2001), which consists of 53 items distributed over nine subscales: Somatization, Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder, Interpersonal Sensitivity, Depression, Anxiety, Hostility, Phobic Anxiety, Paranoid Ideation, and Psychoticism. The original sample consisted of 986 outpatients with unipolar mood disorders. Only subjects with at least three observations and at least one baseline and one intervention observation were included; one subject with an impossible intervention pattern (baseline, intervention, baseline, intervention) was removed. This resulted in a reduced sample of 188 subjects. Since our interest is in a comparison of the different inferential methods rather than conclusions regarding the patients per se, possible selection effects will be ignored. We used the total score on the BSI, which is often used to give an overall impression of a patient's distress level.
The BSI scores for each of the 188 subjects are shown in Figure 5 .2. The scores are plotted against the measurement occasion centered at the intervention point for each subject, with the intervention point defined as the average of the last pre-intervenion occasion and the first post-intervention occasion. The figure shows a wide variety of starting scores and change patterns over time. In general, however, BSI scores tend to decline after the intervention, suggesting a positive effect of the intervention on the mental well being of the subjects. Standardized mean differences 1 between scores from the baseline and intervention phase range from −6.7 to 8.0, with a mean of 1.9 and a standard deviation of 2.1. This suggests that the average effect size is large (Cohen, 1992) , and subjects tend to improve substantially after the intervention.
The question now is whether these observed mean differences are due to true changes or due to random measurement error. In order to quantify the evidence for true change in the data, we will compute one of the Bayes factors from de Vries et al. (tion) for each subject, testing the hypothesis that a subject has a zero mean difference against the hypothesis that a subject has a non-zero mean difference. For comparison, we will also compute the RCI for each subject, with the RCIs based on the last observation in the baseline phase and the last observation in the intervention phase, and the standard error of the differences based on the reliability of the first observations in the baseline phase. Figure 5 .3 contain two important messages. First, the figure illustrates that Bayes factors are close to 1 unless effect sizes are very large. This implies that unless the intervention effect is very strong, the data contain little information about the effectiveness of the intervention: the data cannot differentiate between the hypothesis of true change and the hypothesis of no true change. This lack of information is due to the small amounts of observations per subject in the data set. Furthermore Figure 5 .3 tells us that for some subjects, reliable change would be concluded based on the RCI, while the Bayes factors indicate that there is little evidence for change in the data. This does not mean that one of the tests is wrong; it only illustrates that the two tests have different aims. While the Bayes factor quantifies the evidence in the data for change, the RCI ensures that there is a 5% probability of wrongly concluding that a subject reliably changed. However, it is important to realize that using the RCI as a measure of evidence could result in strong overestimation of the evidence in the data for true change.
Discussion
In psychotherapeutic research ROM is becoming increasingly important. In this paper we discussed two types of hypothesis tests in the context of ROM: hypothesis tests that keep the proportion of false rejections of the hypothesis of zero change below a certain level, like the RCI, and hypothesis tests that quantify the relative evidence in a data set for zero true change versus non-zero true change, called Bayes factors. We clarified why tests like the RCI are not measures of evidence, and illustrated the differences between the two types of tests with an empirical ROM data set. As expected, conclusions could be different depending on the type of test performed, due to the different aims of the tests.
The Bayes factors computed for the example data further indicated that the amount of evidence in the data for or against true change was quite low unless effect sizes were very large. This lack of evidence in the data was mainly due to the small numbers of observations per subject (see also de Vries et al., tion). Unfortunately, the small number of observations per subject in ROM data is not unique to this data set (de Beurs, 2010) . de Vries et al. (tion) showed in a simulation study that increasing the number of observations per subject would substantially increase the amount of evidence contained in the data about change. A general indication for the number of observations required for substantial evidence is hard to determine, however, since it depends on many factors, like the amount of measurement error and effect sizes. At any rate, while increasing the number of observations will be more time and money intensive, collecting only 
